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  Abstract  
 
The principle that the shareholder of a joint-stock company is under the single obligation of paying in his contribution to the 
equity-capital is in force within the framework of the 2011Turkish Commercial Code. It appears as if the reinforced 
principle of “single obligation “critically challenges the relevance of the formerly settled norm of subjecting increase in 
shareholders’ commitments to unanimous consent of all shareholders.  That being said, since the Turkish Commercial Code 
also contains deviations to the single obligation principle in addition to the fact that the notion of increase is shareholders’ 
commitments was not made entirely obsolete from the Turkish Commercial Code, the doctrine for subjecting increases in 
shareholders’ commitments to the general assembly’s unanimous vote is to an extent still relevant within the context of the 
2011 Turkish Commercial Code.  
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Introduction1 
 
Under Turkish law, commercial companies are 
comprised of a variety of commercially oriented entities: 
corporate partnerships, collective partnership and 
partnership in commendam, in addition to corporate 
capital companies, joint-stock corporation, limited 
liability corporation, partnership in commendam by 
shares in addition to the distinct cooperative partnership.  
The scope of the present article is related to joint-stock 
corporations for which the liability of each partner is, in 
principle, restricted with the amount of his concrete 
contribution for the constitution of capital and vis-à-vis 
the relevant company.  
 
Each company regulated under the Commercial 
Code has legal capacity as an entity. For a corporation to 
enjoy its legal capacity distinct from the person(s) who 
provided for the constitution of the corporation, the 
corporate “will” needs to form ideally as a result of the 
deliberations within and by resolutions of the person(s) 
who have, as a rule, provided the equity-capital of the 
corporation, i.e., the general assembly of shareholders.   
 
Corporate logic is based on investment for future 
gain and dependency among its various organs rather 
than immediate actualization of shareholders’ own 
interests. For the actualization of company’s economic 
objects such as to serve the interests of the shareholders 
in the long run, codependency exists between the 
company and the shareholder(s). Rule of majority reigns 
for the corporation to run rather than the independent will 
and intention of each shareholder which is relevant and 
“presumed” rather for creation of contracts. According to 
the Civil Code, Article 2, everyone should abide by 
norms of integrity when enjoying rights and discharging 
obligations while the legal order is not to protect abuse of 
a right. As such, a legal entity’s enjoyment of its legal 
capacity by its machinations must end, the farthest, 
where another person starts. It is the shareholder who has 
expressed his will in order to establish a legal entity to 
perform commercial activity within the framework of an 
                                                          
1
 All legislative clarifying statements referred to in the 
present article are accessible via www.basbakanlik.gov.tr. 
opted type of corporation. On the other hand, such will 
has been expressed for predictable if not specific terms of 
activity which must be maintained with a degree of legal 
security. Based on the foregoing, a condition which has 
prior importance is therefore whether the obligation 
favors the interests of the corporation for which the 
shareholder had legitimately expressed his will at the first 
place by participating to the corporation, as a reflection 
of the affectio societatis element of the memorandum of 
association.  
      
Under Turkish law, three elements which 
distinguish the formation of a company from the 
formation of a regular contract, from an assembly of 
goods or an assembly of persons by law, constitute of (i) 
the contract, (ii) the persons, and (iii) the capital. Among 
them, “the contract’s being a component of the company 
emphasizes that the company is a product of a consensual 
agreement”2. By rule, a type of consideration must be 
articulated for the formation of a contract, yet 
consideration is simply an object of exchange between 
the parties and therefore differs from the notion of 
capital. However, there is the characteristic of affectio 
societatis which further distinguishes a company from 
other contractual formations and also influences how the 
capital must be perceived: affectio societatis, “in its 
broader sense, expresses the intention of each 
shareholder to actively participate to the accomplishment 
of a company’s purpose”3.  
 
The corporation is not a representative of the 
shareholder who is a person separate from the 
corporation as well as from other shareholders. It is 
further noteworthy that, as an organ of a corporate 
company, the general assembly is composed of 
shareholders, each having a mindset on how the purpose 
and the objectives of the company within the framework 
of the company’s purpose can be achieved while each 
considering also his own legitimate interests, accordingly 
asserting an individual will. Such distinction between the 
corporate interests and individual interests becomes very 
apparent, for instance, within the context of repurchase of 
own shares by a company; at a final analysis, “when a 
company repurchases its shares, it transfers company 
assets (the purchase price) to the members from whom 
the shares are purchased”4.  
 
Therefore, is the shareholder really expected to act 
purely to the benefit of the shareholding separate from 
the shareholder’s other legitimate interests? Taking the 
shareholder out of the equation for decisions which can 
however be imposed on any shareholder is neither fair 
nor realistic since such would keep the company too 
                                                          
2 Domaniç, Hayri “Anonim Şirketler Hukuku ve 
Uygulaması” , Temel Yayınları, 1988, p.19. 
3 Domaniç, ibid., p.27. 
4 Cahn, A. and Donald, D. “Comparative Company Law”, 
Cambridge University Press, 2010, p. 241. 
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independent from the shareholder’s will and circle of 
interests.  
 
Obligations which are sufficiently specific to which 
the shareholder has individually committed do not cause 
a concern since they are in conformity with the 
contractual logic. If “the shareholder is constrained to 
transfer a value above the amount he has committed to 
pay, or perform an act which has not been expected at the 
outset”5, if “a decision of the company obliges the 
shareholder to make an expense or discharge an 
obligation which was not present in the original 
agreements”6, then there is a clear case of increase in 
shareholder obligations. Such occurrences generally arise 
due to reasons favoring the corporation or third parties. 
Although constraining the shareholder to obligations in 
an unagreed manner, not all cases may be that clear as 
explained. Some vices thrive in the absence of any 
detection. Therefore, framing certain obligations as 
shareholder commitments initially serves concerns of 
legal security. Secondly, the shareholder’s will should be 
in line with the obligations which such shareholding is 
conducive to, that is in a predictable and measurable 
manner to the extent any contractual obligation must be 
while the principle of equality among shareholders under 
the same circumstances must also be satisfied.  
 
In some countries, the doctrine of increasing 
shareholder commitments by unanimous vote, i.e. the 
requirement to seek unanimous vote of the general 
assembly, thereby consent of each shareholder whose 
commitments increase by various transactions of the 
company. In this article, it is analyzed to which extent 
this doctrine is relevant to joint-stock corporations under 
2011 Turkish Commercial Code.  
 
I. Commitments of shareholders 
 
The classification adopted by the 2011 Turkish 
Commercial Code for personal commitments prioritize 
commitments of financial nature.  
 
1. Primary commitments 
A primary commitment of the shareholder consists 
of obligations and commitments which are to enable the 
formation of a company’s capital:  It is asserted in a 
provision common to all types of corporate companies of 
the 2011 Turkish Commercial Code that “each 
shareholder is liable vis-à-vis the company for the 
                                                          
5 Houpin and Bosvieux, “Traité général théorique et 
pratique des sociétés civiles et commerciales” vol. II, n° 1262, 
cited in Rizzo, Fabrice “Le principe d'intangibilité des 
engagements des associés” Revue trimestrielle de Droit 
commercial,  2000, p. 27 ff.     
6 Hamel, Lagarde and Jauffret “Traité de droit 
commercial” vol. I, 1980, n° 697, cited in Rizzo, Fabrice “Le 
principe d'intangibilité des engagements des associés” 
RevueTrimestrielle de Droit commercial,  2000, p. 27 ff. 
amount of capital it has undertaken in the memorandum 
of association duly draft and signed”7.   
The commitments that a shareholder can make in 
the form of obligations to the company for constitution of 
capital depend on the type of company.  Registration of a 
commercial corporation by the commercial registry as 
well as acquiring title over its shares require the deposit 
of liquid or non-liquid assets. According to the 2011 
Turkish Commercial Code, Article 581 and Article 342, 
liquidity and transferability determine the types of assets 
which can be deposited as capital: Commercial prestige, 
labor or other types of services cannot be deposited as 
capital to a limited liability corporation or a corporate 
capital company in a consecutive manner; such do not 
even qualify as an asset for the formation of capital.     
As far as corporate capital companies are concerned, 
for both the limited liability corporation and the joint-
stock corporation, the major commitment of a 
shareholder vis-à-vis the company is the obligation to 
extend capital.  
 
2. Auxiliary commitments 
 
Generally speaking, there are commitments other 
than the obligation for the constitution of capital of a 
corporation. Especially when managing the capital of the 
company, the “will” of a corporation that is formed in an 
organizational manner is also inclined to ask for 
commitment, impose conditions or simply become part 
of situations which favorably or adversely acts upon 
shareholders’ interests. 
 
Financial commitments other than paying in capital 
can however be considered as commitments independent 
from the constitution of the capital. On the other hand, 
legal security requires that if a financial commitment is 
primarily of a contractual nature, it should abide by 
norms concerning contracts. 8  
                                                          
7 2011 Turkish Commercial Code, Article 128,                   
para. 1  
8 Legislative Clarifying Statement of the 2011 Turkish 
Commercial Code, Article 480, alinea (1), available at 
www.basbakanlik.gov.tr reads as: Madde 480 - Birinci fıkra: 
6762 sayılı Kanunun m. 405 (1)'in  bazı değişikliklerle - yerini 
alan ve tek borç ilkesine açıkça yer veren bu hüküm, anonim 
şirketlerde, Tasarı ile ona dayalı esas sözleşme düzenini egemen 
kılmayı, borçlar hukuku sözleş meleriyle oluşturulabilecek yan 
düzenin esas sözleşme düzenini ortadan kaldırmasına sınırsız 
bir şekilde izin vermemeyi amaçlamaktadır. "Paysahipleri 
sözleşmesi" veya "ortaklar sözleşmesi" diye Türkçeye çevrilen, 
ancak dünyada "shareholders agreement" terimi ile 
adlandırılan, bazen de "joint-venture sözleşmesi" başlığını 
taşıyan, son yılların dünya çapında en "populer" atipik 
sözleşmesi olan bu sözleşme, yabancı öğretide kullanılan terim 
ile esas sözleşme düzeni yanında, çoğu kez ona ve kanuna 
hükmeden veya ikisini de birden bertaraf eden bir "yan düzen" 
yaratmıştır. 
Ulusal hukukun uygun görmediği ve bu sebeple emredici 
hükümlerle koruma altına aldığı hemen hemen her menfaat veya 
hak (çoğu kez) yan düzenle ya zedelenmekte ya da 
sınırlandırılmaktadır. Bu yan düzen güçlüye, hukukunu 
getirmek, hakimiyet kurmak, istediği an istediği fiyatla karşı 
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A difference between the limited liability 
corporation and the joint-stock corporation in terms of 
the explicit wording is that supplementary financial 
commitments are enabled by the 2011 Turkish 
Commercial Code, Article 573, para.2 relevant to the 
limited liability corporation.9 The component of person is 
much less prevalent as far as a joint-stock corporation is 
concerned such that a commitment is attached to the 
shareholding rather than to a certain person even when he 
has a single unit of shareholding at the company. 
Therefore, the principle of single obligation of the 
shareholder was introduced by the 2011 Turkish 
Commercial Code. The said principle is explicitly 
articulated in its Article 480, para.1 such that each 
shareholder is under the single commitment to contribute 
by capital for his shareholding. By barring the imposition 
of any obligation on him other than for his shareholding 
and, if applicable, any premium above the nominal value 
of the relevant shares, does the legislature mean to set the 
financial boundary of the shareholder of the typical joint-
stock company? The provision where the single 
obligation principle is asserted explicitly concerns the 
memorandum of association. That being said, according 
to the legislative clarifying statement of the specific 
provision, the underlying primary aim is upholding the 
memorandum of association as the constitution of the 
joint-stock corporation. The legislature sounds anxious 
not to legally acknowledge agreements in the 2011 
Turkish Commercial Code since such agreements 
frequently thrive along the memorandums of association. 
On the other hand, even such aim as stated in the 
legislative clarifying statement is explicitly limited to not 
permit that contractual obligations and rights by means of 
agreements of which the formation is subject to the Code 
of Obligations override the clauses of the memorandum 
of association regulated by law.  
 
It is noteworthy that the 2011 Turkish Commercial 
Code introduced a restrictive norm which is significant 
                                                                                    
tarafın paylarını almak veya paylarını satmak hakkını 
sağlamaktadır. Veto hakları da bu düzenin önemli silahıdır. 
Kara Avrupası hukukları olabildiği o--randa bu yan düzeni 
sınırlamaya çaba harcamaktadır. 
Tek borç ilkesi, hükümde "esas sözleşmeyle pay sahibine,  
pay bedelini veya payın itibarî değerini aşan primi ifa dışında 
borç yükletilemez" şeklinde ifade olunmuştur. Bu hüküm, yan 
düzenin esas sözleşmeyle düzenlenmesine engel olduğu kadar 
emredici niteliği sebebiyle yan düzenin bazı hükümlerini 
sorgulanabilir konuma getirmektedir. Hüküm başka kanunlara 
engel olucu bir aracı içermemekte, bu görevi sınırlı bir şekilde 
340 ıncı maddenin son cümlesi üstlenmiş bulunmaktadır.  
İlke yönünden 6762 sayılı Kanunun 405 inci maddesinin 
birinci fıkrasının ifadesinde değişiklik yapılmıştır. Mevcut metin 
"fazla bir şey ödemeye esas mukavele ile dahi mecbur 
tutulamaz" diy erek ödeme sözcüğünü vurgulamıştı. Bu da, Türk 
öğretisinde, hükmün sermaye ve prim borcu dışındaki diğer 
para borçlarını kapsamadığı görüşünün ileri sürülmesine sebep 
olmuştu. Onun için 480 inci maddede "borç yükletilemez" 
ifadesi bilinerek kullanılmıştır. Hükümdeki borç sözcüğü geniş 
anlam taşımaktadır.  
9 Cf. Can, M. E. “Limited Şirket Ortağının Borçları ve 
Yükümlülükleri”, Gazi University, Gazi Üniversitesi Hukuk 
Fakültesi Dergisi, 2011/4, p. 3.   
and relevant, also to the single obligation principle: 
According to its Article 340, the memorandum of 
association of a joint-stock cannot deviate from the 
provisions specified in relation to this type of company 
unless such a deviation is explicitly permitted by the 
Commercial Code. Moreover, provisions of another 
(statutory) act permissive of complementary clauses 
within a memorandum of association would be 
applicable within the framework of and limited to such 
an act. The rule of the 2011 Turkish Commercial Code 
sets forth a rule of interpretation and is meant to debar 
loopholes in the statutory regulation of joint-stock 
corporations10 and control the previously assumed liberty 
to get commitments from shareholders by various means, 
e.g. a shareholders’ agreement parallel to a memorandum 
of association. Moreover, the legislator asserts in the 
legislative clarifying statement that the notion of 
“obligation” of the single obligation principle is to be 
conceived in its broad sense11.  
 
Given the restrictive norm of interpretation, the 
provisions of the Code related to the joint-stock 
corporations are to be shed a brighter light on in order to 
detect any explicit wording which enables deviation from 
the single obligation principle. Indeed, within the context 
of conditions of amending the memorandum of 
association, the 2011 Turkish Commercial Code, Article 
421, para.2, alinea (a) provides that a decision which 
imposes a liability to balance a negative account [or 
auxiliary liabilities/ (commitments)] requires unanimous 
vote of all shareholders at the general assembly. 
According to the scholarly opinion, the provision enables 
deviation from the single obligation principle only for the 
stated aim of balancing a negative account12. 
Nevertheless if that deviation calls for a change, it is 
possible by amending the memorandum of association by 
unanimous consent of all shareholders. Further, 
underlying the 2011 Turkish Commercial Code, it is 
stated in various provisions’ legislative clarifying 
statements, viz. those of Article 391, Article 421, para.2, 
Article 476, para. 2, that balancing a joint-stock 
corporation’s negative account constitutes an exception 
as a supplemental financial liability to be assumed by the 
shareholders while requiring unanimous consent of the 
shareholders.   
 
To an extent, 2011 Turkish Commercial Code has 
dispensed with the notion of increase of shareholder 
commitments by adopting the principle of single 
                                                          
10 Cf. R. Karasu, “6102 sayılı Türk Ticaret Kanunu’na geçen 
Anonim Şirketlerde Emredici Hükümler İlkesi”, 6102 sayılı Yeni 
Türk Ticaret Kanunu’nu Beklerken” University of Marmara, 
Faculty of Law, Hukuk Araştırmaları Dergisi, 2012, Special 
Issue of the proceedings held between 10-12 May 2012, vol. 18, 
no.2, p. 311 ff. 
11 Legislative Clarifying Statement of the 2011 Turkish 
Commercial Code, Article 480, alinea (1) . 
12 Poroy, R, Tekinalp, T, and Çamoğlu, E.  “Ortaklıklar ve 
Kooperatif Hukuku”, Vedat Kitapçılık, 2014, p. 607. 
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obligation for the shareholder as far as joint-stock 
corporations are concerned.  If attention is be paid to 
Swiss law, a clause providing an auxiliary commitment 
need to be individually analyzed to see whether the 
clause imposes an obvious financial burden to the 
shareholder. 13  
 
However, not all clauses are explicit as concerns the 
possible financial burden for a shareholder. The criteria 
of “obvious financial burden” has been used however in 
order to not permit occurrences where the financial loss 
for a shareholder was highly obvious and measurable 
rather than cases where the financial loss is not 
predictably measurable at the first place. For instance, 
getting a commitment from the shareholder as to subject 
his transfer of shares to a much lesser value than the 
market value is in fact a disguised restriction or even a 
prohibition on transferring shares.  
 
I.B. Other commitments of non-monetary type 
 
As a very general norm, commitments focused on 
performance can be made as to constitute capital of a 
company, as such enabling a shareholder to discharge its 
obligation to acquire shares by way of performing some 
acts. Indeed, performance commitments can be of 
commercial value for those who benefit even if they do 
not constitute assets as such. As a matter of fact, such is 
enabled by 2011 Turkish Commercial Code, Article 127 
which states to be a provision applicable to all types of 
corporations unless provided otherwise by law14. 
Therefore, as a general rule, commitments for personal 
performance can be exchanged for title to corporate 
partnership. The related obligation is the performance of 
some act by the shareholder. Such acts are generally 
active labor or active management which are supposed to 
benefit the corporation.  As a matter of fact, it has been 
an item of which the evaluation has been generally 
difficult or impossible to be represented and entered into 
corporate accounts in monetary terms. Nevertheless, the 
Turkish Court of Cassation pronounced in 1968 that a 
corporation is entitled to claim from the shareholder to 
perform his obligation.15 Unless the act cannot be 
performed due to reasons where the shareholder cannot 
be held liable for nonperformance16, then at worst, 
damages can be claimed from the shareholder. Therefore, 
even if the performance of such act has not been 
represented in monetary terms in the company accounts, 
the performance of an act still has a value as participation 
to the capital. If a personal performance commitment has 
been made by a shareholder, his shareholding is the 
                                                          
13 Tekinalp et alias, ibid, p. 607. 
14 For exceptions, see the subtitle below in the text of the 
present article.  
15 Decision of the Court of Cassation (Commercial) dated 
26  November 1968,  numbered 1968/6301. 
16 See, Nomer, Haluk “Borçlar Hukuku – Genel 
Hükümler”, Beta Basım A.Ş., 2013, pp. 265 – 270. 
direct product of his commitment to perform unless there 
is a substantial reason not to reframe a commitment of 
personal performance as participation to the capital.  
 
However, not all corporation types enable a shareholder 
to participate to the capital with personal performance. 
Indeed, 2011 Turkish Commercial Code, Article 581, 
Article 342 and Article 307 consecutively excludes acts 
of service and personal labor from the capital of a limited 
liability corporation, the capital of a joint-stock 
corporation and the capital extended by a partner whose 
liability is limited in a corporate partnership in 
commendam.  
 
A further difference is introduced between the limited 
liability corporation and the joint-stock corporation: 
According to its explicit wording, auxiliary commitments 
are enabled by the 2011 Turkish Commercial Code, 
Article 573, para. 2 for the limited liability corporation 
while the joint-stock corporation is to be run primarily in 
accordance with the “principle” of single obligation 
assumed by the shareholder.   
 
When the provision is construed as a principle, it calls for 
interpretation whether the principle is relevant only to 
financial commitments vis-à-vis the joint-stock 
corporation, or the “single obligation” principle is also 
meant to debar any other commitments especially if they 
are not monetary: The legislator asserts that “the notion 
of obligation of the single obligation principle is to be 
conceived in its broad sense”17 .   
 
Shareholder commitments are framed by the 2011 Code 
of Commerce as commitments for capital requirement, 
primary commitments and secondary commitments. The 
(i) commitment for capital requirement is well structured 
because the single obligation principle is primarily 
applicable to the constitution of capital; (ii) other primary 
commitments can arise only to balance a negative 
company account, therefore for the maintenance of 
capital; (iii) secondary commitments are not explicitly 
enumerated by law.   
 
The 2011 Turkish Commercial Code, Article 421, para.2, 
alinea (a) is relevant in the present context since it 
enables imposition of an auxiliary liability to balance a 
negative account of the joint-stock corporation, that is by 
the unanimous vote of all shareholders at the general 
assembly. Since in various provisions’ legislative 
clarifying statements, viz. those of Article 391, Article 
421, para.2, Article 476, para. 2, it is clarified that 
balancing a joint-stock corporation’s negative account 
and other commitments related to non-monetary 
performance constitutes an exceptional financial liability 
to be assumed by the shareholders.  
                                                          
17 Legislative Clarifying Statement of the 2011 Turkish 
Commercial Code, Article 480, alinea (1).  
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If the courts are to construe clauses as to whether they 
survive the single obligation principle, due regard is be 
paid to the implied financial burden on the shareholder if 
the clause is complied with. “Options” are put under 
focus from this regard: an option is a unilateral 
declaration of intention which gives the right to make an 
agreement or entitles the holder of the option to prolong 
an agreement18. Call and put options create legally 
qualified new occurrences initiated by unilateral 
declarations of intention extended by the holders of such 
options. The contract will be formed not before a 
declaration stemming from a call or put option, but once 
it has been received by the other party. Making an 
agreement by unilateral declaration of intention means 
that it does not matter whether other party accepts this 
declaration or not. The contract is formed upon the 
receipt of due notification.  
 
Gained more weight upon the introduction of the 2011 
Turkish Commercial Code, the scholarly opinion to the 
effect that while a call option is not viable due to the 
weakness of any related negotiations, the right of first 
offer survives the single obligation principle.19 The same 
scholarly works suggest that under Swiss Law, such 
clauses are tested by the implied financial burden if the 
commitment was abided by. 20  From this perspective, 
there is no reason why should not be compatible with the 
single obligation principle, innocent options like the tag-
along right of a minority shareholder who is vested with 
the right to join the deal and sell their stake at the same 
terms availed by the majority shareholder who is the 
initial seller.  
 
We believe it is an artificial attempt to reframe 
obligations arising out of options as shareholder 
commitments. Since the legislature justifies introduction 
of certain provisions in the 2011 Turkish Commercial 
Code by the existence of critical risks which arise out of 
contractual agreements among the shareholders or 
between the shareholder(s) and the corporation, then such 
suggests the requirement to acknowledge that the 
legislature has taken on a regulatory attitude even for 
joint-stock corporations which are not publicly listed. 
The courts’ judgment cannot be independent from such 
an attitude. It is pertinent to simply emphasize that law 
cannot protect abuse of any right. The shareholder’s will 
should be in line with the implications of commitments 
for the shareholder and it should be taken into account in 
                                                          
18 Buz, Vedat  “Medeni Hukukta Yenilik Doğuran Haklar”, 
Yetkin Yayınları, 2005, p. 160 ff. 
19 Poroy, R, Tekinalp, T, and Çamoğlu, E.  “Ortaklıklar ve 
Kooperatif Hukuku”, Vedat Kitapçılık, 2014,  p. 607.  Cf.  
Bahtiyar, Mehmet “Anonim Ortaklıkta Payların Üçüncü Kişilere 
Satılması Durumunda Diğer Ortaklara Önalım Hakkı Tanıyan 
Anasözleşme Hükümleri ve Etkileri”, Banka ve Ticaret Hukuku 
Araştırma Enstitüsü,  BATİDER, vol. XXI, no. 2, 2001, pp. 94 – 
95. 
20 Poroy, R, Tekinalp, T, and Çamoğlu, E.  “Ortaklıklar ve 
Kooperatif Hukuku”, Vedat Kitapçılık, 2014,  p. 607. 
the case of a contract, the law of parties meant to be 
formed is based on the shareholding. Such contractual 
obligations which aim to construct the law of the parties 
although they directly relate to a regulated area of law 
like the transferability of shares can only form and be 
maintained in a healthy manner if the liabilities can be 
assessed in a predictably measurable manner. Further, it 
should be possible to assert that there the contractual 
obligation is based on free will which have formed in a 
sufficiently concrete manner at the first place.   
 
Moreover, it is stated in the 2011 Turkish Commercial 
Code, Article 480, para. (4) that in case transfer of shares 
is subjected to the approval of the joint-stock 
corporation, then in addition to the obligation to extend 
capital, commitments can be obtained from shareholders 
which require them to perform various acts in a 
periodical (/repetitive) manner provided that the subject-
matter is not monetary.  
 
As concerns the subject-matter of such a commitment, 
the subject-matter being non-monetary calls for 
interpretation. Under both legal terminology as well as 
financial terminology, when the subject-matter is “non-
monetary”, such excludes cash and not other rights, 
values or assets. Secondly, it is noteworthy that under 
Turkish law, (contractual) obligations are being classified 
in the doctrine also from the perspective of the frequency 
of performance involved in order to discharge an 
obligation: Obligations of instant performance, periodical 
performance and continuous performance constitute the 
types of obligations from this aspect21. Other than those 
specified in the 2011 Turkish Commercial Code, by 
enabling certain obligations of periodical performance in 
its Article 480, para. (4), the stated provision excludes 
other obligations of instant performance or continuous 
performance even if their subject-matters are non-
monetary.  
 
Obligations based on continuous performance are based 
on various degrees of trust between its parties. Therefore 
in principle, the legislature maintains the previous 
understanding that a joint-stock corporation is not based 
on or meant to be conducive to an understanding where 
trust characterizes the relationship among the 
shareholders, or that between the corporation and the 
shareholder(s). 22  
The nature and scope of such commitments of periodical 
performance which are enabled by Article 480, para. (4) 
can be written on the back of the share certificates or 
receipts as applicable. 
 
                                                          
21 See, Eren, Firket “Borçlar Hukuku – Genel Hükümler”,  
Beta A.Ş., 2008,  pp. 99 – 100. 
22 See, Hamamcıoğlu, Esra “Anonim Şirketlerde 
Anasözleşme Değişikliği”, PhD thesis in private law defended at 
the Marmara University, 2011, p. 28, accessible via 
www.yok.gov.tr. 
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Finally, such legislative stance does not rule out 
regulation of critical risk by law or contract when it is the 
minority shareholder’s legitimate interest which is at 
stake. Indeed, the 2011 Turkish Commercial Code 
enables by its Article 531 the minority shareholder(s) to 
request termination of the company due to 
rightful/legitimate reasons which can be conducive to 
such termination, transfer of shares or other suitable and 
acceptable solution by the decision of the court. 
Although of ex post effect, such statutory regulation of 
minority shareholder’s risk is especially meaningful at 
situations where transfer of shares is subjected to the 
approval of the corporation.    
 
Proscribing the shareholders from competing with the 
company is a shareholder commitment which can be 
analyzed in this vein. Rules as concerns noncompetition 
of shareholders with the company are contained in the 
2011 Turkish Commercial Code, but vary depending on 
the type of company. Prohibition to compete may 
(further) be regulated within the memorandum of 
association of the relevant company. If no norm is 
specified in relation to a type of company, and if 
compatible, the 2011 Code of Obligations, Article 626 
applies such that the shareholders cannot perform acts 
favorable to others while impeding the company’s 
achievement of its objective or otherwise to the detriment 
of the company. It cannot be said that competitive 
activities or exercise of separate activities in the same 
sector as the company at which one is a shareholder are 
necessarily to the company’s detriment.  It calls for 
clarification albeit basic that the specified prohibition to 
compete is an extension of the duty of loyalty or is 
simply out of integrity.  According to a legislative 
clarifying statement in relation to the 2011 Turkish 
Commercial Code which is noteworthy also in the 
present context, although the notion of shareholder 
loyalty neighbors the prohibition to compete, it is distinct 
from it.23  
 
From the perspective of a corporation’s interests, 
organizational sophistication of the company as a distinct 
entity, the shareholder’s access to information, increased 
involvement in the company’s business and right of vote 
are considered to justify a prohibition to compete.  That 
being said, when it is a joint-stock corporation which is 
concerned, the general principle of “single obligation” of 
shareholders is deemed relevant also in terms of 
nonfinancial commitments; authors who conceive the 
term “obligation” in its broad sense and not just financial 
such as to validate the principle’s restrictive effect on all 
types of commitments, emphasize that nonfinancial 
commitments could rather be sustained, if applicable, as 
                                                          
23 Legislative Clarifying Statement for the 2011 Turkish 
Commercial Code, Article 613 re duty of loyalty (and 
proscription to compete) of shareholders of limited liability 
corporations.  
contractual obligations24. If it can be deduced from the 
“single obligation” principle that a shareholder of a joint-
stock corporation cannot be prohibited from competing 
with the company, than we assume that the prohibition to 
compete is a type of shareholder commitment which 
cannot be sustained even if contractually. Indeed, such 
commitments are among those occurrences which have 
provoked the regulatory attitude of the legislature and 
need to be weighed by courts also against principles and 
other rights which such commitments conflict with, in 
addition to taking into account the resulting financial 
burden for the shareholder. However such commitments 
cannot find a favorable justification at the 2011 Turkish 
Commercial Code as far as joint-stock corporations are 
concerned.  
 
At situations where an obligation which consists of a 
periodical performance is enabled, obtaining a new 
performance commitment is conducive to following the 
procedure for amending the memorandum of association.  
 
II. Commitments for execution of 
preexisting commitments 
 
Given the single obligation principle as well as Article 
421, para.2, alinea (a) and Article 480, para. 4 of the 
2011 Turkish Commercial Code about other 
commitments, specifying each commitment is an ideal 
for the soundness of not only the original general 
commitment, but also that of an act in order to implement 
a clause or decision binding on the shareholder.  The 
doctrine subjecting increase in shareholders’ 
commitments to unanimous vote also emphasizes 
seeking shareholder consent for such acts of 
implementation would hamper the efficient functioning 
of a company.25 Such concern challenges any view that 
the obligations to which the shareholder has committed 
must been predictably measurable. 
 
 
 
III. Amending the Memorandum of 
Association 
 
Within the context of conditions of amending the 
memorandum of association, the 2011 Turkish 
Commercial Code, Article 421, para.2, alinea (a) 
provides that a decision which imposes a liability or 
auxiliary liabilities/commitments to balance a negative 
account requires unanimous vote of all shareholders at 
                                                          
24 Poroy, R, Tekinalp, T, and Çamoğlu, E.  “Ortaklıklar ve 
Kooperatif Hukuku”, Vedat Kitapçılık, 2014, p.529. 
25 Monsèrié-Bon, Marie-Hélène,  “Encore l'augmentation 
des engagements des associés”, Revue Trimestrielle de Droit 
Commercial, Dalloz, 2004, p. 551.  
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the general assembly.  Given the single obligation 
principle, the provision requires that in order to impose a 
liability to a shareholder as to balance a negative 
company, such should be with the decision of the general 
assembly which could decide favorably only with 
unanimous vote. When the provision is interpreted in a 
teleological manner, the purpose is to subject such 
impositions of liability to the favorable vote of all 
shareholders during the general assembly of the joint-
stock corporation.  
 
IV. Mergers: Issues of increase in 
shareholder commitments 
 
When a merger is considered to require amendment of 
the relevant corporations’ memorandum of association, 
such would be subject to the statutory and regulatory 
provisions regulating amendment of a corporation’s 
memorandum of association. However, the 2011 Turkish 
Commercial Code regulates merger operations in a 
separate manner and distinct from the provisions related 
to amending memorandum of association.  
 
VI.A. Compatibility Between Types of 
Corporations 
 
The legislative clarifying statement of the 2011 Turkish 
Commercial Code, Article 137 is expressive rather about 
the limitation on liabilities vis-à-vis the creditors as an 
underlying reason behind the compatibility required 
between various types of companies that is by especially 
taking into account the form of the acquiring or the final 
emerging company.  
 
A merger can realize by way of acquisition or by way of 
establishing a new incorporation. The 2011 Turkish 
Commercial Code, Article 137 ff specifies compatible 
types of companies which can merge. 
 
The table below shows the companies compatible for 
merger, which can be analyzed in three main categories 
such as corporate capital companies, corporate 
partnerships and cooperative partnership. This 
classification is significant and an accepted one in the 
literature. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Companies Compatible for Merger 
 
 
In essence, while introducing a distinction between 
corporate capital companies and corporate partnerships in 
its Article 124, para. 2, the 2011 Turkish Commercial 
Code does not allow for corporate partnerships to be the 
acquiring party when merging with a type of corporation 
other than that of such intended acquirer. That being said, 
the classification serves to determine whether the 
element of “persons” or rather the element of “capital” 
characterizes the delimitation of the shareholders’ 
obligations and rights related to the corporation.26 At 
corporate partnerships, there is always a partner liable 
vis-à-vis the creditors of the company in an unlimited 
manner while shareholders of a corporate capital 
company do not accommodate such.27 The 2011 Turkish 
                                                          
26 See Köse, ibid, p. 882 
27 For collective corporations, see 2011 Turkish 
Commercial Code, Article 211 according to which partners are 
liable vis-à-vis the creditors of the corporation in an unlimited 
manner. For corporate partnerships in commendam, the 2011 
Turkish Commercial Code, Article 304 and Article 319 are 
relevant in this context; individuals may become partners to the 
latter with unlimited liability vis-à-vis the creditors of the 
corporation in addition to any other person whose corporate 
partnership should be conducive to liability vis-à-vis the 
Companies 
compatible 
for merger 
 
Corporate 
capital 
companies 
 
 
with 
Corporate 
capital 
companies 
Cooperative 
partnership 
Corporate 
partnerships 
(except if it is 
the acquirer) 
 
Corporate 
partnerships 
 
 
 
 
with 
Corporate 
partnerships 
Corporate 
capital 
companies 
(except if it is 
being 
acquired) 
Cooperative 
partnership 
(except if it is 
being 
acquired) 
 
Cooperative 
partnership 
 
with a 
Cooperative 
partnership 
Corporate 
capital 
company 
Corporate 
partnership 
(except if it is 
the acquirer) 
Volume 5 No 2 (2015)   |   ISSN 2158-8708 (online)   |   DOI 10.5195/emaj.2015.85  |   http://emaj.pitt.edu 
 
 
Joint-Stock Corporation under Turkish Commercial Law and  
the Doctrine of Increasing Shareholder Commitments 
Page |86| Emerging Markets Journal 
Commercial Code permits rather the corporate capital 
company to be the acquirer if a merger also involves a 
corporate partnership. Such principle is introduced 
thanks to another principle in its Article 158, the Code 
prevents release of those shareholders from liability from 
an obligation of the acquired partnership vis-à-vis the 
partnership’s creditor for a period of three years starting 
from the date by which the decision for merger was 
publicly announced.  
  
In essence, the point of focus for compatibility in 
mergers is the shareholder rather than the creditor. It can 
be deduced that the limitation on shareholder 
commitments from the perspective of the shareholder has 
been influential on the legislature’s perspective for 
enabled mergers.  
 
 
IV. B. Rule of Majority for Mergers  
 
The 2011 Turkish Commercial Code permits for a 
merger operation to be conducive to supplementary 
financial obligations, other personal performance 
commitments, personal duties or other obligations for the 
shareholders by the will of the merging corporations or 
due to the variation in the type of company merged into; 
according to the Commercial Code, Article 147, alinea 
1(g) and (h), such duties should be made explicit in the 
merger report the draft of which is requisite. Even such 
merger report can be dispensed with under certain 
conditions sought by law.   
 
The merger needs to be approved by the general 
assembly of the merging corporations unless the acquirer 
already holds a qualified majority of the other  
corporation’s shares. For approval of the merger, the 
general assembly quora sought for equity-capital 
companies vary. For a limited liability corporation, the 
quorum sought is three-fourths of the shareholders which 
should be representative of three-fourths of the equity-
capital. Apart from the limited liability corporation, as 
concerns the other two types of corporate capital 
company, viz. the joint-stock corporation or corporate 
partnership in commendam by shares, a quorum of three-
fourths is sought for the general assembly to approve the 
merger which should be  representative of the majority of 
the actual or issued equity-capital as applicable.  
 
The 2011 Turkish Commercial Code specifies that, the 
merger agreement “may” provide for a remunerated opt-
out of the relevant company being subjected to merger. 
Moreover, it is explicitly permitted that the merger 
agreement provides only for remunerated opt-out28.  That 
                                                                                    
creditors upto the amount he has participated to the equity-
capital. 
28 “Opt-out” is specified in 2011 Turkish Commercial 
Code, Article 141.  
being said, a provision for remunerated opt-out should be 
voted separately as to seek a quorum of ninety percent of 
the votes existing at a corporate capital company, or the 
unanimous vote of the shareholders vested with voting 
rights at a corporate partnership as applicable29. 
 
IV.C. Simplified procedure for mergers  
 
A point in legislation where the notion of increasing 
shareholder commitments has been held in consideration 
is when introducing a simplified procedure applicable to 
mergers. Only if recourse can be made to the simplified 
procedure for mergers, then it is not necessary to submit 
the merger agreement and other documentation to the 
general assembly. 2011 Turkish Commercial Code, 
Article 155, a merger can be effected by simplified 
procedure if the acquiring corporation owns all of the to-
be-acquired company’s shares vested with voting rights. 
Even if the acquirer owns not all, but at least ninety-five 
percent of the shares vested with voting rights, recourse 
to the simplified procedure is possible provided that the 
merger would not be conducive to any supplementary 
monetary liability, personal performance obligation or 
personal responsibility against the shareholder(s) holding 
the remainder. Therefore, the individual consent of such 
shareholders is sought to deviate from the full procedure 
for mergers according to which the merger agreement 
was to be vote by the general assembly.  
 
IV.D. Requisite general assembly quorum for a 
decision on merger 
 
As a rule, decisions of mergers need to be taken at the 
general assemblies of the involved companies after 
works involved in order to realize the merger. As 
concerns joint-stock companies whose shares are not 
listed on the stock-exchange markets, the decision 
quorum sought for the general assembly is three-fourths 
of those present at the assembly provided that such 
quorum represents the majority of the equity-capital or of 
the issued capital as applicable. Therefore, unless more 
than a quarter of those present at the general assembly 
opposes the merger, shareholder(s) representing the 
majority of the capital can issue a decision favorable to 
the merger.  
 
The merger of a joint-stock corporation into a limited 
liability corporation is conducive to a regime which is 
not covered by the single obligation principle applicable 
to joint-stock corporations. Indeed, pursuant to the 2011 
Turkish Commercial Code, Article 151, para.4., when a 
joint-stock corporation is to be acquired by a limited 
liability company and if the merger is conducive to or 
increases auxiliary commitments or personal 
performance commitments, then the merger should be 
                                                          
29 2011 Turkish Commercial Code, Article 151, para.5, 
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approved by unanimous vote of the relevant general 
assembly. Such requirement is parallel to the doctrine of 
increase of shareholders commitments. 
 
V. Recourse to the judiciary for violation  
 
A general assembly decision can contravene the 
principles or other norms concerning shareholder 
commitments by failing to satisfy procedural 
requirements, the quorum sought or due to its content. 
 
V.A. Challenging a general assembly decision 
 
A.1. Action to have a general assembly decision 
rescinded 
 
2011 Turkish Commercial Code provides that a general 
assembly decision in violation of statutory norms, or the 
memorandum of association, and especially a decision 
not observing norms of integrity can be rescinded by a 
request to the commercial court. 2011 Turkish 
Commercial Code, Article 446 is worded as to entitle 
shareholders, the board of directors and members of the 
board of directors in an individual manner.  
(1) Such a shareholder who can ask for rescission 
should be in a position to either (i) prove that their 
interest in such a result as requested is not only 
legitimate, but also they have opposed to the decision in 
the general assembly, or  (ii) justify that he’s entitled to 
initiate an action by asserting that failures to comply with 
certain procedural rules are (at least) among those factors 
which enabled such a decision to be taken. The 
provision’s wording reads such that a shareholder cannot 
avail of this course of action if he simply did not or could 
not oppose the decision except if a procedural failure was 
influential in enabling the decision to being taken;  
(2) Also the board of of directors is entitled to 
initiate an action for rescission in its capacity as an organ 
of the corporation; 
(3) Even a member of the board of directors can 
lodge for the rescission of such a general assembly 
decision if he would be vulnerable to a risk of being held 
liable for executing the relevant decision. 
 
Different from requests for rendering a general assembly 
decision null and void, action for rescission should be 
initiated within a term of three months starting from the 
date by which the decision was issued. 
 
A.2. Action to render a general assembly decision 
null and void 
 
A novelty of the 2011 Turkish Commercial Code is the 
provision that a general assembly decision can be 
declared null and void, that is acknowledging the 
invalidity of a decision, in addition to situations where a 
general assembly is rescinded.  Taking into account 
rather the “content” of the decision, a general assembly 
decision can be declared to be null and void according to 
Article 447 if the decision restricts a shareholder’s right 
which stems from the law or contravenes the main 
structural features of joint-stock corporations.  
 
V.B. Comparison of the two types of actions 
against a general assembly decision 
 
Despite the substantive and procedural differences 
between rescission of a general assembly decision and 
declaring it null and void, the 2011 Turkish Commercial 
Code regulates common points of these actions. The 
2011 Turkish Commercial Code specifically provides 
certain interim measures upon pleadings that is while 
hearing a case for rescission of a general assembly 
decision, or to declare it null and void:  
(i) the board of directors is required to duly 
announce the pleadings and the date of 
hearing, as such especially have that 
information announced on the internet site 
of the relevant company;  
(ii) after hearing the board of directors on the 
matter, the court may – in the interim - 
rule for suspense of the relevant decision;   
(iii) the court may order the plaintiff to deposit 
a caution for an eventual loss of the 
relevant company to arise due to the 
proceedings. If the court orders deposit of 
a caution upon the defendant’s request, 
the court is to decide on the type and 
amount of the caution.  
 
Different from grounds for rescission however, grounds 
for declaring a general assembly decision null and void 
stems from concerns of public order. Within the context 
of the present subject analyzed, it is noteworthy that 
according to the doctrine subjecting increase of 
shareholders commitments to unanimous vote, “in order 
to sue for having such a general assembly decision null 
and void, it is not necessary to have voted against it”30; 
such approach is valid if the single obligation principle is 
considered not to override, but to be taken in conjunction 
with the doctrine in a manner as to form a main structural 
feature of the joint-stock company constituting a norm of 
public order.  
 
Finally, whether for rescission or declaring a general 
assembly decision null and void, a favorable court ruling 
would be effective with regard to all shareholders and not 
just those persons who have initiated the action.  
 
                                                          
30 Saintourens, Bernard “L'annulation, à la demande d'un 
associé, d'une décision d'assemblée emportant augmentation des 
engagements des associés votée à l'unanimité”, Revue des 
sociétés 2004 p. 97. 
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V.C. Challenging the validity of a resolution of the 
board of directors 
 
Another possibility is that a resolution of the board of 
directors contravenes the principles or other norms 
concerning shareholder commitments by failing to 
observe especially the separation of functions or due to 
the content of the resolution. 
 
 
C.1. Action for rescission of a resolution  
 
At a private joint-stock corporation, if the board of 
directors has been authorized to increase the equity-
capital of the company up to the registered amount of 
equity-capital, the 2011 Turkish Commercial Code, 
Article 460, para.1 enables the board to decide for 
increasing the equity-capital in accordance with the Code 
and within the limits of its power set forth by the 
company’s memorandum of association. As such, for the 
board of directors to issue shares for a value above the 
nominal value or restrict the existing shareholders’ rights 
to acquire new shares, it is required that the board’s 
authority is provided by the memorandum of association.  
In case of failure to observe the said rules, 2011 Turkish 
Commercial Code, Article 460, para. 5 permit recourse to 
the court aiming at rescission of such a board resolution. 
By explicit reference of the Code, its provisions from 
Article 448 to 451 relevant to the rescission of a general 
assembly decision applicable to joint-stock corporations 
are applicable also in respect of the rescission of such a 
resolution of the board of directors. 
 
C.2. Action to render a resolution null and void 
 
The 2011 Turkish Commercial Code, Article 391 enables 
the competent court to “declare” a resolution of the board 
of directors null and void “particularly” for lack of 
conformity with mandatory provisions and for lack of 
conformity with main principles in respect of the 
functioning of a joint-stock corporation. Such main 
principles include acting in accordance with the main 
structure of a joint-stock corporation as well as 
separation of functions among the company’s bodies.  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The relevance of the doctrine of increasing 
shareholder commitments by unanimous consent of 
shareholders was critically weakened in the 2011 Turkish 
Commercial Code owing to the reinforcement of the 
single obligation for the shareholder as a principle as far 
as joint-stock corporations are concerned. The legislature 
rather emphasizes other principles as genuineness of 
capital, principle of single shareholder obligation and 
maintenance of capital which moreover figure as 
structural features of the joint-stock corporation. 
Nevertheless, due to the deviations from the single 
obligation principle, the doctrine concerning increase in 
shareholder commitments is not entirely overridden. For 
instance, the notion of increase of shareholder 
commitments is preserved with respect to mergers 
absorbing a joint-stock corporation. Further, the 
distinction introduced by the referred doctrine in France 
as concerns the difference between reduction of rights 
and increase in shareholder commitments can be 
considered pertinent within the 2011 Turkish 
Commercial Code: if a shareholder right or interest is 
reduced or not sustained, per se, such does not translate 
to an obligation for the shareholder, therefore not by 
itself challenging the single obligation principle. We 
exposed certain normative as well as theoretical grounds 
for the referred doctrine to be upheld in conjunction with 
the principle of single obligation. Finally, such analysis 
is meant to support resolution of conflicts in a healthy 
manner rather than trying to construe the 2011 Turkish 
Commercial Code in a manner totally detached from the 
past case-law arising from the referred doctrine when 
relevant.  
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